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Dear friends, with a heavy heart, I have to say goodbye to you all 
as I, along with many other fellow Bangladeshis, no longer exist 
in this country! As some of you may have come to know by now 
also, our government, through a press note released yesterday, 
has reminded everyone that there are no indigenous people 
(Adivasi) in this country since the word itself is not in the 
constitution! The government has particularly requested aca-
demics, newspaper editors and other members of the civil society 
to refrain from using the ‘A’ word in seminars, talk shows etc. 
being organized as part of observance of the International Day of 
the World’s Indigenous Peoples tomorrow, August 9. As someone 
who belongs to one of many ‘small’ ethnic groups that have 
sought recognition as ‘indigenous peoples’, and as an anthro-
pologist who has supported this demand through various articles 
since 1993, it seems that it is now time for people like us to go 
back to where we came from (we are supposed to be ‘immigrants’ 
compared to the Bengalis, said to be the true ‘sons of the soil’ of 
this country). After all, you cannot argue with powers that say, 
‘The constitution does not mention you. Therefore you do not 
exist.’, or have been heard saying, in the past, ‘We want the land, 
not the people.’ Thus, as I walk into the sunset of an identity that 
seems doomed, let me say, so long! Perhaps we will meet again. 
If you meet someone with labels like ‘backward’, ‘tribe’, ‘minor 
race’ or ‘ethnic sect’ – terms that the constitution does approve of 
– look closely. It might be someone you have known by another 
name, at another time. 
This statement was issued on Facebook by one of my friends on 
August 8, 2014. Within a few hours, it received more than 400 ‘likes’ 
and more than 100 comments. Users belonging to Bangladesh’s so-
called indigenous population, along with users from all over the 
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country, Europe, and other parts of the world, expressed their 
sympathy or raised more controversial questions. The immense 
attention that this statement received underlines the urgency of 
examining issues of indigenousness within the body politic of 
Bangladesh; such urgency may seem strange initially, because less 
than three percent of the total population fall under the category 
labelled by activists as ‘indigenous’. At the same time, readers familiar 
with the topic may be reminded of the debates that have taken place 
with remarkable continuity over the last two decades: the question of 
whether the term ‘indigenous people’ can be applied in the Bangla-
deshi context was raised as early as 1993.1  
The statement above shows that the recognition of indigenous 
people by the state continues to be a crucial demand in identity politics 
in contemporary Bangladesh. Its significance stems from multiple dis-
crimination experiences, structural inequalities and the fear of being 
exterminated by the state, which protects and promotes the interests 
of the ethnic majority. The aim of the activist movement that has 
emerged in Bangladesh during the last couple of years is to address 
these inequalities and pursue the state to implement appropriate 
policies. This paper will show that the concept of indigenous people is 
of central importance for this aim.   
Why do activists today insist on indigeneity as a category of self-
ascription? The above statement shows that the government offers 
alternative terminologies, such as ‘minor race’ or ‘ethnic sect’, the 
connotations of which are less depreciative than the terms ‘backward’ 
or ‘tribe’– concepts which were predominant earlier and continue to 
dominate debates in other contexts, as well as official debates. What 
difference do these categories make? My Facebook friend apparently 
prefers ‘indigenous people’ over alternative labels, but the usefulness 
of this term has also been controversially discussed. ‘Indigenous 
people’ may imply “the return of the native”, as Adam Kuper has 
provocatively glossed it in his much-cited article (Kuper 2003). He 
argues that the label of ‘indigenous people’, as promoted by the United 
Nations (UN), restores the “ghostly category of ‘primitive peoples’” and 
raises problems pertaining to ancient yet threatened lifestyles (ibid: 
389). In essence, Kuper argues that the newly established notion 
reproduces the derogatory connotation of colonialist labels because it 
rests upon the general European belief that citizenship is a matter of 
ties of blood and soil, and therefore is nothing more than old wine in 
new bottles.  
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Many notable scholars support Kuper’s assumptions and seek to 
illustrate what Alpa Shah has convincingly termed the “dark side of 
indigeneity” (Shah 2007). The notion’s essentialising preoccupation 
with priority and ownership is particularly troubling because it draws 
clear-cut demarcations between those who enjoy certain privileges and 
those who are excluded (Geschiere 2009). Furthermore, Shah shows 
that local appropriation of the global discourse on indigeneity main-
tains a class system and leads to the marginalisation of the poorest. 
Taking up the various critical argumentative strands, Clifford (2013) 
reminds us that indigenous movements need to be located in shifting 
power relations and that the histories of conquest and hegemony must 
be considered. He further proposes the notion of “indigènitude” to 
capture the “vision of liberation and cultural difference that challenges, 
or at least redirects, the modernising agendas of nation-states and 
transnational capitalism” (Clifford 2013: 16) which has developed 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s.  
Seen from this angle, the notion of indigeneity can be regarded as a 
concentration of sources of identity formation and projects of identity 
politics that operates on multiple scales – from local traditions to 
national agendas and symbols to transnational activism. With such a 
relational approach, indigeneity becomes more than a potentially dan-
gerous political project because it opens new avenues for researching 
the tension between loosened imperial and national hegemonies and 
globalising neoliberalism – which in turn offers new opportunities for 
indigenous activism (ibid: 17) to lobby for the recognition of minority 
rights, social inclusion and the alteration of existing inequalities. 
In particular, the potential of the concept of ‘indigènitude’ for 
fighting existing inequalities within and beyond nation-states has been 
highlighted. Part of this potential lies in its functional dimension, i.e. its 
relevance for delimiting the scope of international instruments which 
proclaim either the rights of indigenous people or the duties of states 
in relation to indigenous people (Kingsbury 1995: 13). It thus provides 
an entry point for activists to relate to more or less legally binding 
international laws, treaties and conventions and opens avenues to put 
pressure on the state with the help of transnational activist alliances. 
These networks provide spaces and channels through which an 
“indigenous voice” (Tsing 2007) is articulated. Despite certain com-
plications and limitations, these networks certainly lend support to 
local activists in a variety of ways (cf. Gerharz 2012; 2014a for the 
Bangladesh case). Moreover, I will argue in this paper that the dis-
cursive dimension of indigènitude, the international language of indi-
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genous people, widens activists’ room to manoeuvre and their scope 
not only for claiming the mitigation of inequalities but also for ensuring 
dignity and self-assurance for a discriminated section of citizens within 
the nation-state. Instead of embarking on critical perspectives and 
judgements, I thus take Clifford’s observations as a starting point for 
the analysis and consider indigènitude as a social fact which requires 
investigation itself.  
In particular, I look at the ways in which this global project becomes 
relevant on national and local scales. Therefore, I try to resist the 
temptation to categorise the population which activists today label as 
‘indigenous’ but look instead at the debate that has evolved around the 
various terms and concepts to do with the issue. By tracing the 
different denominations and concepts, as well as the politics behind 
them, from a historical perspective, the aim of this article is to 
elucidate the contestations and struggles over ‘claiming’ and ‘naming’. 
In doing so we can begin to perceive the power relations between the 
actors involved.  
The first part of the paper deals with some contextual issues and 
traces major historical developments in ethnic divisions in South Asia. 
The second part shows how the discourse of indigenous belonging has 
evolved in East Pakistan and Bangladesh; its main focus is on the 
Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), located in the southeast, where the 
majority of indigenous people live. In the third section, this paper 
looks into the contestations over the concepts and various deno-
minations of groups whom my Facebook friend refers to as ‘indigenous 
people’ that have emerged since Bangladesh’s independence and how 
these are related to the politics of nationalism. The evolution of a 
translocal activist movement in relation to the UN initiative for the 
rights of indigenous people constitutes the fourth part, followed by a 
section that reveals the activists’ strategies at the national level and 
the response of the state. The conclusion raises some questions 
concerning future prospects.  
The South Asian Context   
Since colonialism, South Asia’s ethnic and religious diversity has been 
subject to efforts to order, classify and categorise it. Colonial admin-
istrators, missionaries, orientalists and, later, anthropologists created 
images of South Asian society which rely upon static, timeless and 
spaceless features (cf. Bal 2007: 24). The bewildering variety of 
people as well as their social, cultural and religious practices became 
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subject to analysis, mostly in racial terms. Closely related to this 
project, which primarily aimed to facilitate administrative rule by 
providing systematic information about society, was the creation of 
hierarchical orders. This process also involved an essentialising of 
groups of people which held them to display inherent, heritable, per-
sistent or predictive characteristics and which thus had a biological 
bias.2 In addition to modernist differentiations between civilised Euro-
peans and primitive Asians, internal hierarchical orders were set up, 
and these led to the formation of colonial categories – which became 
subject to post-colonial critique later on.  
These categorisations have resulted not only in an extraordinary, 
obstinate persistence of racial thinking in the South Asian region but 
also in the manifestation of differences between majority and minority 
populations. From the beginning the latter, usually labelled as ‘tribal’ 
populations, have fascinated anthropologists, who seek to study their 
customs, practices and institutions – attempts which are embedded in 
modernist images of society, where the ‘tribal’ represents the original 
and pure way of life, unpolluted by the influences of modernity. Seen 
as representing an early stage of evolution, tribal societies are 
regarded as isolated, self-contained and primitive social formations 
(Béteille 1998: 187; van Schendel 2011). 
Such concepts were considered as scientifically safeguarded and 
informed post-colonial attempts to create independent nation-states 
according to the Western model. Alongside ideas of race, the sig-
nificance of blood and soil determined the visions of early nationalists 
in South Asia of what a nation-state with the potential to advance to 
civilised levels should look like. The idea of homogeneity was of crucial 
significance within these visions. In the newly founded nation-states of 
India and Pakistan, thus, clear demarcations between the more or less 
culturally homogeneous national majority population and so-called 
minority populations were drawn. Whereas the major political divisions 
within the continent existed between Muslims and Hindus, each of 
them constituting a majority/minority in the newly founded nation-
states, the so-called tribal population initially fitted into neither 
category.  
When the subcontinent was divided into India and Pakistan, the 
boundaries between the two religiously defined ‘communities’ became 
fixed and were equated with the borders of the nation-state, and 
‘tribal’ populations began to be regarded as minorities within the 
nation-state. The clear demarcations, which also implied hierarchical 
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orders, left very few options open to the ‘tribal minorities’. Facing ex-
clusion and severe marginalisation or, as is the case in India, more or 
less paternalistic policies for inclusion with the help of affirmative 
action have left indigenous populations little space to challenge 
widening social and economic inequalities. In the light of post-colonial 
modernisation projects, these gaps have widened even further, and in 
many parts of South Asia indigenous populations have become either 
mere ‘victims’ of development projects (for example, through eviction) 
or their explicit subject. Both processes have determined the fate of a 
large portion of Bangladesh’s indigenous population since the depar-
ture of the British colonisers from the continent.  
The Bangladeshi Case 
The various groups to whom my Facebook friend and supporters of 
indigenous activism refer as ‘indigenous’ differ from the mainstream 
Bengali population in linguistic, cultural and religious terms and live 
scattered all over the country with some concentrations in the northern 
part. Several of these groups share cultural similarities with popu-
lations in India, such as the Garo, Khasi, Santal, Koch and others. In 
the areas populated by these groups, land reforms and demographic 
changes in particular regions have had a particularly troubling impact 
on people’s living conditions (Barkat et al 2009; Bleie 2005; Bal 2007).  
While these populations, usually referred to as ‘plain land Adivasi’, 
now form majorities in small pockets of the region at best, indigenous 
populations used to be the majority in the Chittagong Hill Tracts 
(CHT), a hilly region in the southeast of Bangladesh, bordering 
Myanmar and the Indian states of Mizoram and Tripura. Colonial 
attempts to secure control over the CHT territory enforced a policy that 
was based on the maintenance of traditional institutions. The so-called 
CHT Regulation of 1900 thus proposed an administrative structure to 
rule the area and to guarantee the collection of taxes; however, this 
entailed protectionist measures. Without the permission of the deputy 
commissioner, no foreigner was allowed to enter or reside in the CHT 
(Shelley 1992: 77). This measure has always been highly contro-
versial. On the one hand, it has been argued that it served primarily 
the interests of the colonisers and excluded the people living in the 
CHT from developing a market economy. On the other hand, indi-
genous activists have praised the Regulation for protecting the people 
of the CHT from exploitation and the intrusion of outsiders.  
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When the subcontinent was divided into India and Pakistan, the CHT 
was allocated to Pakistan. This went together with a gradual dilution of 
protective measures, followed by the implementation of a large-scale 
modernisation project. The area was officially labelled a project area 
for economically useful development (van Schendel 1992: 116), which 
implied massive transformations in agricultural policies.3 Slash and 
burn cultivation (jhum), which was the traditional mode of agricultural 
production for subsistence and countertrade, had been regarded as 
backward under colonial rule and was further discouraged. Rubber 
plantations were established instead, and a huge industrialisation 
project led to the construction of both a paper mill and a hydroelectric 
project. The latter was completed in 1963 with the help of foreign aid, 
and its water reservoir swallowed up almost half of the land suitable 
for plough cultivation, which was already scarce, and forced more than 
100,000 people to flee the area. Only about one third of the lost land 
has been compensated for (Mohsin 1997: 114).  
Although it was expected that the area and the people living therein 
would experience a considerable economic uplift, the opposite hap-
pened: the indigenous population got very little access to emerging 
economic niches in the industrial, agricultural and fishing sectors. A 
survey conducted in 1979 showed that 93 percent of the indigenous 
population considered their economic condition to have been better 
before the construction of the dam (ibid.: 116).  
In the aftermath of the construction of the dam, activism developed 
in the CHT, and a political leadership emerged which attempted to 
represent the interests of the indigenous population. The major issue 
was the protection of minority rights in political and social, as well as 
economic, terms. With the country’s independence from Pakistan in 
1971, the nation-building project put much emphasis on the linguistic, 
economic and political autonomy of the Bengali-speaking population. 
This further exacerbated the marginalisation of minorities and led to 
unequal majority–minority relations. Initial attempts to implement 
protective measures for minorities were turned down by the govern-
ment. While the interests of the groups in the plain land, who also call 
themselves ‘Adivasi’,4 were mainly incorporated into the country’s 
leftist movement, nationalist policies let to an armed conflict between 
the Government of Bangladesh and the Parbatya Chattagram Jana 
Sanghati Samiti (PCJSS—United People's Party of the Chittagong Hill 
Tracts), which sought to fight for the autonomy of the CHT region.  
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Parallel to the political articulation of the hill people’s demands, local 
youths made an attempt to protect their rights with the help of wea-
pons left over from the liberation war (Mohsin 1996). In the context of 
increasing polarisation, these local militant forces, who called them-
selves Shanti Bahini, were incorporated into the PCJSS as its military 
wing. The Bangladeshi state tended to regard the CHT mainly as a 
security problem and challenged the insurgency movement with 
massive militarisation and the re-settlement of landless Bengalis from 
the plain land. This led to the large-scale eviction of indigenous people 
from the communally owned land. More than 25 years of armed 
conflict resulted in severe human rights violations, including “mas-
sacres, torture, rape, illegal detention, looting, arson, forced labour, 
forced marriages and forced conversion to Islam” (Arens 1997: 1817). 
In addition, more than 70,000 hill people fled to India; many more 
were internally displaced. Only in 1997 was a peace accord signed and 
this armed conflict brought to an end.  
Nationalist Ideologies of the State and the Politics of Naming 
Why do you Bangalis call us upajati5 (sub-nation)? We have a 
language, culture, religion and land of our own. We may be few in 
numbers, we may be a small nation but we are not sub-anyone. 
We are egalitarian people. Please don’t impose your notions of 
hierarchy upon us; these are alien to us. (Roy 2003: 179) 
The activist who shared his thoughts with the late Chakma Raja Tridiv 
Roy captured the issue in a nutshell: with the country’s independence 
in 1971, nation-building attempts based on Bengali nationalism institu-
tionalised the hierarchical relationship between the Bengali population 
and others. This process, however, did not come out of nowhere and 
instead must be seen in connection with both colonial policies and the 
rule of Pakistan. In his memoirs, Raja Tridiv Roy convincingly argues 
that the introduction of alternative modes of agricultural production, 
e.g. plough cultivation and the concept of private property, had 
already paved the way for the “erosion of the Hill people’s com-
munitarian and egalitarian way of life” (Roy 2003: 179). This went 
along with the introduction of the general term ‘tribal’ to denominate 
the hill population as well as, to some extent, the Adivasi population in 
the plains.  
With industrialisation under Pakistani rule, this process extended 
further, and the abolition of the CHT’s special status as a Wholly 
Excluded Area paved the way for Bengali intrusion. Paradoxically, this 
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came about through an attempt to grant the people of East Bengal the 
benefits of democracy with elections to the provincial legislature in 
1954. The Pakistani government had decided to include represent-
tatives from the CHT in these elections, but this also meant that the 
provincial assembly could interfere in the affairs of the CHT. Tridiv Roy 
states: “We were afraid that under the guise of democracy the govern-
ment would take away the already attenuated safeguards the hillmen 
enjoyed and the complicated and myriad rules and laws of the province 
would be made applicable to the Tracts” (Roy 2003: 148). The politics 
of Bengali nationalism, thus, were already quite powerful in East Pak-
istan, and the system of governance allowed these political forces to 
work towards the marginalisation of the indigenous population.  
Bengali nationalism rests on the assumption that nation-building is a 
matter of defining the “core-nation” in ethno-cultural terms, thus 
“nationalising nationalism” (Brubaker 1998: 277). The independence 
movement and also the first government grounded their claim for an 
independent nation in the idea that Bengali language and culture 
constitute the markers that define belonging to the nation. As a con-
sequence, the non-Bengali-speaking and culturally diverse populations 
were subordinated to the national population and turned into ‘Upajati’. 
This is supported by the famous utterance of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, 
the leader of the independence movement and Bangladesh’s first 
prime minister, in response to the PCJSS leadership’s assertion of its 
worries over the threat of extinction: “From this day onward the tribals 
are being promoted into Bengalis” (Mohsin 1996: 44). This invitation 
to assimilate completely ignored the indigenous people’s demand for 
recognition of their distinctiveness, and its ignorance reaffirmed the 
assumed hierarchical relationship.  
Terms like ‘tribal’ and ‘Upajati’ rest on the assumption that there is 
an idea of unity manifested in the overarching identity-label of ‘indige-
nous people’ in Bangladesh or in the CHT. Historical accounts similarly 
prove that the distinction between plains and hills also led to collec-
tivising denominations such as ‘Pahari’ (hill people). In the Chittagong 
region, Bengalis also used terms such ‘Joomas’6 and ‘Kookies’, as well 
as ‘Mug’, to refer to the hill people (van Schendel 1992: 100). But for 
the people themselves there was little unity; rather, the members saw 
their group as the primary identity category. This continues to be the 
case today to a great extent, because the linguistic, religious and cul-
tural diversity among the indigenous population itself is extreme, and 
internal frictions manifest in hierarchies between more or less powerful 
groups in either socio-economic terms or in terms of their ability to 
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articulate their claims in the political arena. Being a Chakma, Marma, 
Mro or Lushai is thus more important in people’s everyday lives than 
collectivising notions.  
When the Government of Bangladesh turned down the demands of 
the indigenous population for recognition in the early 1970s and 
political as well as militant activism intensified, new ideas emerged. In 
order to mobilise public support for the PCJSS, secure its backing by all 
groups living in the CHT, and bring forward claims for all non-Bengali-
speaking people living in the CHT, the organisation needed to find a 
common identifier. The term ‘Jumma’, which means swidden cultivator, 
was chosen because the practice of swidden (shifting) agriculture 
seemed to be the common denominator among the various groups. 
Moreover, emphasising this traditional mode of cultivation relates to 
(post-)colonial efforts to transform agricultural production and turns 
them upside down. Instead of denoting the backwardness of swidden 
cultivation, Jumma nationalism relates this practice to pride and col-
lective self-confidence. It thus stands in sharp opposition to the 
Bengali population and clearly demarcates the ethnic boundaries 
between ‘us and them’. It can also be regarded as the first serious at-
tempt to invent an indigenous model of state, society and culture (van 
Schendel 1992: 121).  
The fact that the practice of shifting cultivation is placed at the core 
of this new identity category also signifies a special relationship to the 
land. While for the PCJSS, and particularly its armed wing, it served as 
a justification to construct the CHT as a homeland which needs to be 
protected, van Schendel (ibid.) highlights an inherent paradox. He 
states that the connection between nation and land is not traditional 
among shifting cultivators because they used to consider land as a free 
gift of nature and not as a possession. Territorial thinking only de-
veloped in response to proprietary claims by the British and their 
successor governments, along with the introduction of private property 
rights in land and the exploitation of national resources. In his article, 
van Schendel states that the term Jumma links the CHT people to the 
emerging activism for the rights of indigenous people, which has been 
on the rise since the early 1980s. Whether this newly emerging win-
dow of opportunity influenced the PCJSS’s decision to enter into a 
peace process with the Government of Bangladesh in the late 1990s is 
doubtful.7 However, efforts to institutionalise mechanisms for the pro-
tection of indigenous people at the global level have encouraged 
politically active indigenous people in Bangladesh to take up the 
language of indigeneity.   
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The Activist Movement and Translocal Connections 
Expectations were high after the Peace Accord was signed by the 
Government of Bangladesh and the PCJSS in December 1997. It was 
hoped that the new government would take serious steps towards 
reconstruction and reconciliation, as well as to meet the demands for 
recognition of the hill people’s rights and self-determination. Initial 
efforts to implement some of the provisions of the Accord, including 
the establishment of a regional council, were made, but a lack of poli-
tical will impeded their success. Similarly, the three Hill District 
Councils, which were to be strengthened, faced serious problems in 
their work. The Ministry of CHT Affairs was also established – with an 
indigenous person as minister – but the last couple of years have 
shown that the ministry represents the interests of the government 
vis-à-vis the CHT, rather than the other way around.8 In addition, not 
all politically active hill people supported the Peace Accord; the United 
People’s Democratic Front (UPDF) took a strong stance and voiced 
some serious arguments against it. This has led to a violent conflict 
between the PCJSS and the UPDF.9  
Initial hopes were dashed when the opposition won the elections in 
2001 with a clear stance that was contrary to that of the previous 
government. Although the Awami League raised new hope during its 
election campaign in 2008, hardly any of the promises it made have 
been fulfilled. Today, the CHT are in a state of no war/no peace, with 
heavy militarisation, an anti-Pahari movement of Bengali settlers who 
have strong relationships with the military forces, an increasing level 
of exploitation of natural resources – including land grabbing – and, 
above all, at least three different, opposing factions among the politi-
cally active indigenous people – allegedly with military support on all 
sides.  
Parallel to the struggles and negotiations between political actors in 
Bangladesh, the international initiative for the rights of indigenous 
people gained momentum. After the International Year of the World’s 
Indigenous People in 1992, the first International Decade of the 
World’s Indigenous People was proclaimed in 1993, followed by a 
second Decade which ends in 2015. The Decades were marked by a 
variety of activities, including institutionalisation through the Per-
manent Forum on Indigenous Issues, and activities in the various local 
and regional contexts. In 2007, the United Nations Declaration for 
Indigenous People’s Rights was endorsed after a 23-year-long process. 
It provides a set of “minimum standards for the survival, dignity and 
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well-being of the indigenous people” (Oldham and Frank 2008: 5). 
Although not binding, it is an “internationally sanctioned legal in-
strument that aims to advance the codification of indigenous rights in 
national constitutions and legal systems” (Shah 2007: 1806) and thus 
may constitute a precursor to a legally binding convention.  
Furthermore, two conventions of the International Labour Organi-
zation (ILO) explicitly address the rights of indigenous people. 
Convention 107 applies to members of tribal and semi-tribal popu-
lations, and Convention 169 to tribal peoples and peoples who are 
regarded as indigenous (Kingsbury 1995: 20). Convention 107 was 
ratified by Bangladesh in 1972. In addition, the World Bank and other 
international development agencies have developed their own policies 
on indigenous people, which are also relevant in the Bangladeshi 
context.   
One outcome of the UN initiative is the annual celebration of 
International Day of the World’s Indigenous People on 9 August, which 
is celebrated globally, nationally and locally. This opportunity to gather 
and to remind the national public of their existence and their demands 
has helped indigenous people to organise themselves and to establish 
networks. In Bangladesh it is significant that, combined with the end of 
the conflict in the CHT, this has encouraged indigenous activists from 
all over the country to create networks and organisations that address 
concerns that are not only specific to a particular region but potentially 
affect all indigenous populations within the national territory. Only a 
few of these networks are well institutionalised, one of which is the 
Bangladesh Indigenous Peoples Forum (BIPF). However, some of these 
initiatives have been subject to a variety of criticisms, and it seems 
that the entire field is becoming more and more segregated.  
Aside from these institutionalised forms, personal networks are very 
important, as are organisations that are concerned with a broad range 
of issues (human rights, education, environmentalism, gender and so 
forth) and also address indigenous issues. Compared with the indi-
genous activists from the plains, the CHT activists have a relatively 
long history of professional activism. In addition to militant activism, 
they have also been involved in political activities (like the formulation 
of the Jumma nationalism programme) for many years (cf. van 
Schendel 2001). These activities were incorporated into transnational 
networks quite early, thanks to well-established relationships with 
Indian and Filipino activists, but also with organisations from the West, 
where campaigns against human rights violations started in the 1980s. 
One example of such alliances is the CHT Commission, which was 
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formed in 1990s and carried out a number of field investigations on 
the basis of which it produced reports documenting the human rights 
violations in the CHT.10 
Networking activities have also benefited from the formation of 
transnational spaces as a result of migration. Today, we find com-
munities of migrants from the CHT in the United States, Australia, 
Korea, Japan, France and elsewhere who have formed networks based 
on their support for the indigenous population in Bangladesh. Most of 
them specifically address Jumma issues, but some also deal with the 
rights of indigenous people in a more general sense. Indigenous 
activism in the plains, however, has been mainly incorporated into the 
activities of the communist parties, who continue to speak for the 
indigenous population as well as landless peasants and other 
oppressed populations, and who also have a considerable voice within 
the national political realm. In addition, some of these populations, like 
the Garo, Santal and Khasi populations, belong to Bangladesh’s small 
Christian community, which has a long tradition of the development 
and delivery of social services, quite often combined with political 
activism (cf. Gerharz 2012).11 
The increasing awareness of the potential of indigenous activism at 
the global level has also altered the national activist figuration. The 
various relationships between local and national actors which shape 
the latter also reach beyond the national space, and can best be des-
cribed as translocal space, because structuration takes place at and 
between different societal levels (cf. Gerharz 2012). Translocal space 
consists not only of activists who consider themselves as indigenous 
people but also others who seek to support and speak on behalf of the 
indigenous population (Gerharz 2014b). The global language of 
indigeneity is a crucial asset for the activist figuration for various 
reasons. 
First, the terminology is a suitable unifier for the extremely diverse 
conglomerate of groups with different languages, religions and tra-
ditions. In order to tie it back to the local context, activists have also 
embraced the notion of ‘Adivasi’, which is commonly referred to as a 
direct translation of the term indigenous people. However, Tripura 
notes that the Bengali word ‘Adibashi’ literally means ‘original in-
habitant’, which is synonymous with ‘indigenous’ but has acquired the 
connotation of ‘primitive’.12 At the same time, Indian activists have 
increasingly taken up the notion ‘Adivasi’, which has acquired a posi-
tive meaning in contrast to the common denomination ‘tribal’. ‘Adivasi’ 
has also recently been adopted in Bangladesh, and ‘indigenous people’, 
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or ‘IP’, and ‘Adivasi’ are used interchangeably to refer to all indigenous 
populations.  
Second, the language of indigeneity serves the aim of relating to the 
global indigenous community. Social media such as Facebook, but also 
other virtual platforms, encourage indigenous people from all over the 
world to communicate their problems and demands, to exchange ideas 
and to learn from each other. Several Bangladeshi activists participate 
in these forums in an active way and also receive support in the event 
of atrocities and human rights violations. Similar relationships also 
exist beyond the virtual space. Indigenous activists from Bangladesh 
frequently participate in meetings of the Permanent Forum and other 
global meetings on indigenous issues. Moreover, they take part in glo-
bal events on other topics where the position of indigenous populations 
is considered.  
For example, consultations on global climate issues usually allocate 
some seats to representatives of the global indigenous community in 
order to make sure that their voices are considered in the negotiation 
process. Thanks to well-established relationships within the Asian con-
tinent, Bangladeshi indigenous activists are regularly invited as one of 
the Asian indigenous representatives. Last, employing the language of 
indigeneity provides new opportunities to voice demands for the 
recognition of minority rights within the national realm. In Bangladesh, 
a window of opportunity for launching a campaign for constitutional 
recognition emerged in the late 2000s, when the Awami League re-
gained power over the state.   
Scope and Limitations of the Language of Global Indigenous 
Rights  
In 2010, an indigenous caucus was formed within the National Parlia-
ment. Equipped with the confidence that the established networks and 
legitimising power of the language of indigeneity had consolidated the 
movement’s bargaining power not only in the general public sphere but 
also in the policy-making process, the main aim of the caucus was to 
work towards the inclusion of the term ‘indigenous people’ in the 
Bangladeshi constitution in the course of the ongoing process of 
amendment. The working group comprised a couple of parliamen-
tarians belonging to both the indigenous and non-indigenous sections 
of society. 
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In particular, they lobbied for the inclusion of the term ‘indigenous 
people’ in Article 23, which defines the obligation to protect and de-
velop minorities. It was hoped that this would open new vistas to 
develop affirmative action mechanisms for indigenous people on the 
basis of overcoming their “historical discrimination”.13 The official 
adoption of the terminology also helped the activists to lobby for the 
recognition of the United Nations Declaration for Indigenous People’s 
Rights. This recognition would also mean that the special relationship 
to land, as it is expressed in indigenous people’s collective land rights 
(as opposed to the individual land rights system among the Bangla-
desh population) could be officially recognised and protected.  
The new initiative benefited from the positive incentives provided by 
the transnational support network. Several developments conveyed 
the rising significance of the issues of Bangladesh’s indigenous people: 
Raja Devasish Roy, the chief of the Chakma circle14 in the CHT and a 
renowned lawyer, was elected by the Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC) to the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Peoples Issues 
(UNPFII) 2011-2013 in June 2010. In 2009, the UNPFII had appointed 
Lars-Anders Baer, a member of the Permanent Forum as well as the 
CHT Commission, as special rapporteur to undertake a study of the 
implementation status of the CHT Peace Accord,15 which highlights the 
attention paid to Bangladesh in the United National system. At the 
same time, the Government of Bangladesh had sent out positive 
signals: the Prime Minister and other government officials had re-
peatedly made use of the terms ‘Adivasi’ or ‘indigenous people’ and 
had publicly shown their support for the indigenous movement. Seve-
ral politicians had participated in public meetings and given speeches 
in support of the recognition of indigenous people’s rights.  
The activists, the media, and the concerned public discussed the 
potential success of the constitutional amendment intensively. During 
the gatherings on the World’s Indigenous People’s Day in August 2010, 
the amendment was the main demand. In their speeches, the invited 
government officials showed their solidarity. The political discourse 
was supplemented with a performative component when a group of 
musicians sang a ‘traditional song’ into which they had inserted the 
sentence “We want constitutional recognition”, in English, as a refrain. 
Overall, most activists and participants were quite optimistic about the 
potential success.  
In March 2011, when the committee that had been formed to 
coordinate the constitutional amendment announced that the term 
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‘small ethnic minorities’ (khudranrigoshti) would be included in the 
constitution instead, there was considerable indignation and frustra-
tion. Despite protests by national activists as well as their international 
partners, particularly the CHT Commission, the National Parliament 
endorsed the amendment, with Article 23A of the Constitution reading 
as follows:  
The culture of tribes, small ethnic groups, ethnic sects and 
communities – The State shall take steps to protect and develop 
the unique local culture and tradition of the tribes [Upajati], 
minor races [khudro jati shotta], ethnic sects and communities 
[nrigoshthi o shomprodai].16 
The denial of constitutional recognition went together with some other 
governmental initiatives that have been interpreted as being directed 
against indigenous activism. This became particularly clear in 2011, 
when the Ministry of Home Affairs released a circular that imposed re-
strictions on the Indigenous People’s Day celebrations. The circular 
states that: 
a) necessary instructions may be sent to the concerned persons 
so that (on Indigenous Day) government high officials do not give 
speech/comments that are conflicting/contradictory to the policies 
of the government undertaken at different times. b) It might be 
monitored so that no government patronisation/support is pro-
vided during the World Indigenous Day. c) Steps might be taken 
to publicise/broadcast (by providing related information) in the 
print and electronic media that there are no Indigenous people in 
Bangladesh. d) The month of August is recognised nationally as 
the month of Mourning. Hence, such unnecessary amusement 
programmes in the name of Indigenous Day in this month should 
be avoided.17  
This strong opposition against the indigenous peoples’ movement is 
congruent with Bengali nationalism, which has been promoted by the 
ruling party, the Awami League, since independence. Furthermore, the 
involvement of transnational allies and the institutional backing of the 
UN system did not lead to the desired result but provoked govern-
mental resistance.  
The juxtaposition of these two dynamics can be seen as underlying 
the government’s decision to refrain from strengthening the position of 
indigenous people in the constitution. The arguments provided by the 
proponents of Bengali nationalism have been exploited in opposition to 
the claim of indigenous people by a couple of political protagonists, 
one of which is the military, which seeks to maintain its powerful 
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presence in the CHT. Ostensible cultural homogeneity, as it was 
promoted during and immediately after independence, has provided 
the ground for maintaining national unity in Bangladesh. The current 
Prime Minister, Sheikh Hasina, who is the daughter of Sheikh Mujibur 
Rahman, the great Awami League leader and the ‘Father of the 
Nation’, continues to argue for Bengali nationalism through reference 
to her father’s legacy. Thus, the following sentence was added to 
Article 6 (2) of the Constitution: “The people of Bangladesh shall be 
known as Bengalees as a nation and the citizens of Bangladesh shall 
be known as Bangladeshis.” 18  
The reaffirmation of Bengali nationalism and the subsequent 
rejection of indigenous demands came as a surprise and provoked 
some very emotional reactions. Retrospectively, several factors con-
tributing to the government’s decision to take this kind of standpoint 
can be identified. First, the national debate on authenticity and ori-
ginality was deeply entrenched in the events that took place at the 
level of transnational activism. The special rapporteur of the UNPFII, 
Lars-Anders Baer,19 who is also a member of the international CHT 
Commission, submitted his “Study on the Status of Implementation of 
the Chittagong Hill Tracts Accord of 1997” in May 2011, which was 
very timely. In this report he takes a critical stance as he highlights 
the ongoing militarisation in the CHT and highlights severe short-
comings with regards to governance. The UNPFII accepted several of 
the recommendations to the Government of Bangladesh, such as the 
full and timely implementation of the Peace Accord of 1997, the pre-
vention of Bangladeshi military personnel involved in human rights 
violations of indigenous people in the CHT from participating in the UN 
peacekeeping missions,20 and the establishment of independent and 
impartial commissions of enquiry to address human rights violations 
against indigenous people in the CHT.  
The Government of Bangladesh strongly opposed these recom-
mendations. The first secretary of the Bangladesh mission to the UN 
submitted a statement to the Permanent Forum saying that there were 
no indigenous people in Bangladesh and that the Peace Accord had 
nothing to do with indigenous issues. Therefore, the government 
claimed that the UNPFII, with its mandate to deal with indigenous 
issues, would not have “any locus standi” in discussing issues relating 
to the CHT Peace Accord.21 
After the request to include the notion of indigenous people in the 
constitution was declined, government representatives repeatedly 
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stressed that the concept itself could not be applied to the Bangladeshi 
context. Former Foreign Minister Dipu Moni, stated at the Economic 
and Social Council that the people living in the CHT were not indi-
genous in the sense of the definition provided by the United Nations, 
but had arrived in the region as asylum seekers and economic 
migrants.22 
While on the international stage government representatives rushed 
to deny the existence of indigenous people in Bangladesh, there was 
once again strong opposition to activist demands at the national level. 
In public discourses there was a tendency to interpret the notion of 
indigenous people as an international concept that foreigners sought to 
transplant into Bangladesh. The attempt to support the national move-
ment at the level of transnational activism by increasing pressure on 
the Bangladeshi government thus failed. Although the special rap-
porteur, highly committed to the struggle of indigenous peoples within 
Bangladesh, tried to seize the window of opportunity provided by the 
open atmosphere during the discussion about the constitutional 
amendment, his attempt resulted in a backlash. This episode shows 
the limited scope for transnational activism and reveals that its po-
tential for success is highly dependent on context. In Bangladesh, 
granting indigenous rights would imply far-ranging concessions that 
are crucial to the national interest with regards to the ideal of a cul-
turally homogeneous nation.23 
Concluding Remarks 
In this paper I have shown that the categories used for naming a social 
collective have changed over time. The denominations for those who 
are called ‘indigenous people’ by many activists, both in Bangladesh 
and globally, have depended on the policies and aims of the respective 
authorities as well as on their developmental agendas. What can be 
seen today is that various approaches and political agendas exist 
concurrently. On the one hand, the nation-building project of the 
Bangladeshi state relates to ideal images of citizenship, which continue 
to rest upon the utmost homogeneity in cultural terms. On the other 
hand, globalised discourses and the rising significance of transnational 
connections have given legitimacy to approaches that seek to define 
particular populations ‘beyond the nation state’. In the case of indi-
genous people, these attempts are related to contemporary rights-
based approaches which rest upon the premises of the universalist 
claims for human rights as well as social, cultural and economic rights. 
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The Bangladeshi case, however, shows that the politics of nationalism 
continue to circumvent the validity of such claims and that the inte-
rests of majority populations within the nation-state seem more 
legitimate to some than the protection of minority interests.   
Paradoxically, both dimensions can be interpreted as being directly 
related to recent globalisation processes. Globalisation, in the sense of 
deterritorialisation, has opened new avenues for denationalisation and 
the permeability of boundaries and therefore paves the way for uni-
versalist claims. In that sense, the emergence of indigenous activism 
can indeed be regarded as challenge to the modernisation efforts of 
nation-states, as Clifford has described. However, rising numbers of 
incidents of collective violence can also be traced back to the growing 
pressure from globalising forces, which threatens nationalist ideals of 
cultural purity within nation-states and leads to the reassertion of 
we/they constructions in ethnic terms (Appadurai 2006). Minorities 
thus become a problem because they challenge the national narratives 
of social cohesion and homogeneity.  
In times of intensifying pressure from global and transnational 
forces on almost all states, a densely populated and comparatively 
resource-poor nation-state like Bangladesh is particularly challenged to 
find ways to secure the livelihoods of its citizens and ensure their well-
being. Seen from this angle, the stubborn insistence of indigenous 
activists to recognise the existence of their constituencies as culturally 
different, yet historically discriminated and marginalised citizens who 
seek to ensure their equal treatment by means of protection, seems to 
be particularly hopeless. Despite all critiques concerning the essen-
tialising overtones and potentially racist connotations of the concept of 
indigenous people, the question remains: what alternative ways do 
populations which have been regarded as inferior to the majority 
within the nation-state have to ensure the accomplishment of equality? 
Neither activists nor academics have yet found a convincing answer to 
this question. 
                                                          
Endnotes 
1
 http://ptripura2.wordpress.com/2013/12/17/ip-year-1993-keynote-paper/[retrieved 20.08.14].  
2
 This has also been stated in the context of critical perspectives on the relevance of the concept 
of race in South Asia (Robb 1997: 1).  
3
 This process had been initiated by the British colonial administration, who sought to transform 
the agricultural practices that were considered to be backward and not market-oriented.  
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4
 ‘Adivasi’ is used as the Bengali equivalent for ‘indigenous people’. 
5
 The term ‘Upajati’ has become a common denominator for the indigenous population in the 
newly born state of Bangladesh. 
6
 ‘Jooma’ is equivalent to ‘Jumma’ (shifting cultivator), a term which has gained political rele-
vance.  
7
 The decision to end the violent conflict and enter into peaceful negotiations was influenced by a 
few different factors, including India’s unwillingness to sustain the Shanti Bahini anymore.  
8
 The ministers have been appointed on the basis of their loyalty to the ruling party.  
9
 A few years ago another faction emerged which disagrees with the dominant political party, the 
PCJSS. There are accounts which testify that all three fractions receive support from the armed 
forces and there is good reason to assume that this is part of a strategy to weaken the political 
forces.    
10
 The CHT Commission was initiated by the Amsterdam-based Organising Committee CHT 
Campaign and the International Working Group for Indigenous Peoples in Copenhagen. Following 
a largely inactive period of about eight years, the commission was reformed in 2008.  
11
 However, Christian institutions usually tried to refrain from voicing their demands too loudly in 
a country with such an overwhelming Muslim population.  
12
 http://ptripura2.wordpress.com/2013/12/17/ip-year-1993-keynote-paper/                           
[retrieved 29.08.14].  
13
 This was the term used by one activist supporting the initiative during my fieldwork in 2010.   
14
 In the CHT, there are three administrative circles, each one headed by a traditional chief, or 
raja.   
15
 http://www.iwgia.org/news/search-news?news_id=307 [retrieved 20.08.14]. 
16
 http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/pdf_part.php?id=367 [retrieved 29.10.14).  
 
17
 http://de.scribd.com/doc/102343718/English-Version-Not-to-Celebrate-Ip-Day    
[retrieved 18.08.14]. The government has declared August a month of mourning because in 
August 1975, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and his family were killed in a military coup. His daughter, 
Sheikh Hasina, the current prime minister of Bangladesh, survived.  
18
 Cf. http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/pdf_part.php?id=367 [retrieved 29.10.14].  
19
 See the Special rapporteurs' study on the status of implementation of the Chittagong Hill Tracts 
Accord of 1997 presented at the UNPFII here: www.iwgia.org/news/search-news?news_id=307 
[Retrieved 29.10.2014]. 
20
 The Bangladeshi Army has become one of the main providers of staff for UN peacekeeping 
missions worldwide.  
21
 See press statement of the Chittagong Hill Tracts Commission, 5 June 2011. 
 https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B8ka4FwgZxAMX1hmdWpGMkRRV3M/edit?pli=1   
[retrieved 29.10.14]. 
22
 Statement by Chakma Raja Devasish Roy, 27 July 2011. http://www.bdnews24.com [retrieved 
24.08.14]. 
23
 Another dimension, which can be referred to only briefly here, is economic interests. These 
interests are directly linked to the demilitarisation of the CHT as demanded in Baers’ report. 
Conversations with experts in Bangladesh reveal that the military depends on the CHT as a 
“training ground” for soldiers who are to be deployed in UN peacekeeping missions. As these 
missions constitute an important source of income for the Bangladeshi army, the withdrawal 
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from the CHT would diminish the soldiers’ exposure to practical training, which is a requirement 
for taking part in the UN missions. The second issue is access to land, which has been one of the 
core arguments throughout the armed conflict and remains highly topical in densely populated 
Bangladesh. A recent study by Adnan and Dastidar (2011) reveals that the security forces as well 
as state institutions continue to be involved in the redistribution of land in the CHT through 
acquisition and land-grabbing.  
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